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Ricœur’s Philosophy of the Will and Living Metaphor as Creative Praxis 
Iris J. Brooke Gildea 
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Abstract 
This article presents the conceptual groundwork for a “poetics of the self” by theorizing how and why a 
creative praxis rooted in Ricoeur’s philosophy of the will and hermeneutics of the living metaphor contributes 
to an individual’s on-going development of self-awareness. Its focus is on the affective fragility that manifests 
in an individual’s intermediary status of polarities – finitude and infinitude, freedom and nature – in 
conjunction with Ricœur’s tensional status of metaphorical truth. The act of writing poetry, it suggests, can be 
an aesthetic mediation that develops insight into the primordial discord of the servile will. 
Keywords: Paul Ricœur, Poetics, Hermeneutics, Self. 
Résumé 
Cet article jette les bases conceptuelles d’une “poétique du soi.” Il explique comment et pourquoi une praxis 
créative, conçue à la fois à partir de la philosophie ricœurienne de la volonté et de son herméneutique de la 
métaphore vive, contribue au développement continu de la connaissance de soi. Pour ce faire, il met l’accent 
sur la fragilité affective qui se manifeste chez l’individu en raison de son statut d'intermédiaire entre deux 
polarités – finitude et infinitude, liberté et nature – en la mettant en relation avec le statut tensionnel de la 
vérité métaphorique chez Ricœur. Il suggère enfin pour conclure que l’acte d’écrire de la poésie peut 
constituer une médiation esthétique par laquelle on développe une meilleure compréhension du discord 
originaire de la volonté servile. 
Mots-clés: Paul Ricœur, poétique, herméneutique, soi. 
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Introduction: A Poetics of the Self 
This article revisits Ricœur’s philosophy of the will and hermeneutics of the living 
metaphor to consider the role that poetics play in an individual’s development of self-awareness. 
Its focus will be a discussion of how poetic discourse, considered here as ‘creative praxis,’ offers 
individuals access to awareness and expression of experiences that exceed the confines of 
speculative language and thought. In Ricœur’s view, such experiences are aligned with an 
individual’s suffering and are in and of themselves “preliterary”: “What is more, to memory and 
suffering are attached those modes of narrative at the preliterary level that I sacrificed to the benefit 
of dealing with sophisticated forms of narrative literary fiction and historiography.”1 He adds to 
this statement, “[…] I did not emphasize enough our difficulty, even our incapacity to bring to 
language the emotional, often traumatic experience that psychoanalysis attempts to liberate.”2 
Working from the suggestion that certain experiences resist traditional forms of narrative 
emplotment, a suggestion at the heart of Morny Joy’s edited collection, Paul Ricœur and Narrative: 
Context and Contestation, from which Ricœur’s above quote is taken, my present aim is to examine 
a level of preliterary Ricœur experience through a lens rooted in Ricœur’s philosophy of the will. 
Rather than traumatic or socially conditioned experiences, here, I focus on the more primary and 
existential tensions of “primordial discord.”3 As Ricœur suggests: “No conflict between ourselves 
and some process susceptible of conferring upon us an assumed personality could be interjected if 
we were not already this disproportion of living and thinking, of which our heart suffers a 
primordial discord.”4 Accessing and expressing suffering and its dialectical counterpart of 
belonging or “oriented happiness” rooted in primordial tensionality through one’s own creative 
enactment of living metaphors is what I envision as the praxis of a poetics of the self. 5 
My project’s guiding supposition, then, is that if to be human is to be situated – 
psychologically, physically, emotionally, intellectually – within a finitude-infinitude dialectic that 
manifests as primordial discord, as Ricœur’s philosophy of the will suggests, then every human is 
capable of feeling and expressing a personal experience of existential discord.6 The difficulty for 
living-with and understanding such discord, arises, however, because as Ricœur concludes in the 
three works that comprise his philosophy of the will and in The Rule of Metaphor, these experiences 
of discord cannot be adequately described in speculative language and therefore cannot be 
adequately appropriated into cohesive understanding of one’s life – thus their absence in his 
‘sophisticated’ study of narrative in Time and Narrative and Oneself as Another, as noted above.7 The 
present study invites exploration of how an individual’s own efforts to express her affective 
fragility of existential tension in the discourse most apt to support it, poetics, may be conducive to 
a greater hermeneutic processes of becoming aware of and learning to live in relationship with the 
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embodied conflicts rooted in dialectics of freedom and nature, i.e. subjective perspective and 
objective belonging.8 Such exploration is important if not necessary, because the primordial 
tensions at the centre of Ricœur’s philosophy of the will, as they surface in personal and lived 
experiences rather than theoretical constructs, are most often buried in the depths of depression 
and/or brashly ignored as one lives in what Kohák terms the “promethean defiance” of the servile 
will, a polarized reaction that can add to one’s already rooted being-in suffering.9 
The poetics discussed below thus invite an individual’s experiences of the fragmentary, 
the non-linear, and the contradictory feelings of simultaneously embodied polarities such as love 
and hate, forgiveness and revenge, entanglement and isolation, finitude and infinitude, etc., to 
surface in awareness exactly as they are felt. To let such feelings rest without need or want, at least 
immediately, to emplot them in linear and/or rational understanding. This invitation is aligned 
with Buss’s call for a “reentanglement” of emotion, body and mind in her article, “Women’s 
Memories and the Embodied Imagination.” Buss applies a feminist lens to Ricœur’s theory of 
metaphor: “I desire a story that does not emerge, or disentangle, but rather re-emerges, that is, 
marks itself off, ‘emerges,’ only to point to the way it is merged, the way it is entangled, in a way 
that privileges ‘background,’ as a guarantee of the human being.”10 Similarly, I seek to invite an 
individual’s poetic articulation of the embodied background of entanglements in which she lives, 
thinks and feels in order to develop ‘poetic consciousness,’ i.e. an ability of living-with tension 
rather than speculatively categorizing and understanding it, a consciousness modeled after the 
structures of Ricœur’s living metaphor. 
This conceptualization of a poetics of the self does not rest in and of itself in developing 
ability to be-with and express primordial tensions. Eventually, one’s poetic utterances can integrate 
into a greater hermeneutics of the self such that an individual cultivates a dialectical relation 
between her poetic and speculative consciousnesses. From this perspective, the work of creative 
praxis eventually enters into the fabric of cultural symbols that make up the “texts” in which we 
encounter ourselves through the phenomenological process of appropriation and 
disappropriation.11 Applying this integrative and creative process in community work and/or 
education, for example with the participants of my own community practice, survivors of gendered 
violence, brings Ricœur’s philosophy of the will and phenomenological hermeneutics into a very 
relevant and culturally redemptive engagement of creative praxis at the intersections of poetics, 
interpretation, narrative, recognition and justice – dimensions that encapsulate the span of 
Ricœur’s own intellectual development. I here seek to lay the theoretical groundwork from which 
such a practice can emerge.12 
Affective Fragility & Metaphorical Truth 
“How can freedom be itself and in bondage? How can it be set free as freedom and 
responsible in its very deliverance?”13 Such is the guiding question of Freedom and Nature that sets 
the trajectory for Ricœur’s philosophy of the will as he explores what is at the core of human 
freedom: an innate binding, a paradox expressed in the dialectical relationship of the voluntary 
and the involuntary. As a means of further contextualizing a poetics of the self, exploring how 
engaging in poetic praxis potentially relates to our experiences of a bound freedom, I revisit 
Ricœur’s philosophy of the will through a lens of the living metaphor.14 
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Kohák introduces Ricœur’s concept of the servile will and a tendency for the human to 
experience polarized tensions of selfhood in Freedom and Nature: 
Existence, as we approach it in experience, is always existence distorted by fault. Yet the 
fault – as the pathological-is not intelligible in itself, but only in terms of the essential 
structure which it distorts. The bondage of passions, when it is not conceived as a bondage 
of freedom but as the essential human condition, inevitably leads to a view of man which 
either loses sight of freedom altogether, reducing man to an essentially passive victim of a 
radically alien nature or asserts freedom in a spasm of Promethean defiance which rejects 
nature altogether […].15 
It is this dichotomized view of freedom as an absence of selfhood or a spasm of 
“Promethean defiance,” mentioned above, that Ricœur’s philosophy of the will sought to mediate 
be depicting a dialectical relation of a tensional and intermediary experience of two extremes: 
His is intermediate within himself, within his selves. He is intermediate because he is a 
mixture, and a mixture because he brings about mediations. His ontological characteristic 
of being-intermediate consists precisely in that his act of existing is the very act of bringing 
about mediations between all the modalities and all the levels of reality within him and 
outside him. […] man appears to be no less discourse than perspective, no less a demand 
for totality than a limited nature, no less love than desire […] man is no less destined to 
unlimited rationality, to totality, and beatitude than he is limited to a perspective, consigned 
to death and riveted to desire. Our working hypothesis concerning the paradox of the finite-
infinite implies that we must speak of infinitude as much as of human finitude. The full 
recognition of this polarity is essential to the elaboration of the concepts of intermediacy, 
disproportion, and fallibility, the interconnections of which we have indicated in moving 
from the last to the first of these concepts.16 
This article’s claim is that it is specifically the tensional and intermediary status of human 
experience, dialectical relations encapsulated as the “servile will” but as the above passage shows 
explored by Ricœur in several iterations of tensional experienced counterparts – finitude and 
infinitude, discourse and perspective, love and desire, etc., – that allow and invite the living 
metaphor to serve as a linguistic register capable of expressing these felt discords conditional to 
our human nature. The literary space that becomes “metaphorical truth” in The Rule of Metaphor, 
subsisting in a tensional and intermediary status of meaning, discussed most fully in Ricœur’s 
study on philosophical and poetic discourses, can, I suggest, be viewed in terms of a linguistic 
utterance capable of expressing the primordial discord explored in Ricœur’s early work. 
Halsema and Enriques write of Ricœur’s dialectic of poetic and philosophical discourses, 
“especially in his last study of the The Rule of Metaphor he shows the possibility and fertility of a 
dialogue between the poetic and the conceptual fields for advancing philosophical knowledge 
while maintaining the specificity of both.” Halsema and Enrique continue “the semantic innovation 
brought to light by metaphor is only a promise of meaning.”17 A poetics of self, as I articulate it 
here, takes a different stance. From the perspective of active engagement in creative praxis, I 
consider the semantic innovation of metaphorical truth to be more than a promise of meaning. In 
Halsema and Enrique’s context, metaphor and poetic discourse offer a promise of meaning for 
Iris J. Brooke Gildea 
 
 
Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies     
Vol 9, No 2 (2018)    ISSN 2156-7808 (online)    DOI 10.5195/errs.2018.436    http://ricoeur.pitt.edu   
93 
 
93 
 
speculative thought, but from the consideration of the philosophy of the will, I argue, metaphorical 
discourse offers a surfacing of existential presence whose roots extend into the very discord of 
existential finitude that occupies the focus of Ricœur’s early work. This claim is certainly not to 
suggest that every poetic utterance is such a manifestation of tensional and primordial selfhood, 
but that in turning to the poetic expression of tensions that reject speculative language, we open 
up the possibility that we can make contact with the feelings of the existential paradox of being, 
developed in the philosophy of the will, signaling and heightening the “ontological index” of 
metaphorical discourse. This index is especially heightened, as an element of praxis, if the discourse 
in question is not a supposition of philosophically constructed poetics but is an individual subject’s 
own utterance able to enter into the body of texts whose ‘worlds’ she and others critically engage 
and hermeneutically encounter.18 
The “feelings” given form through their expression in poetic discourse are not to be 
dismissed as raw, cathartic and/or narcissistic outpours of emotion – though, as certain therapeutic 
models argue, aesthetically mediated cathartic outpours can be symbols of deep and rich existential 
positing and meaning.19 I view the feelings articulated by a poetics of the self through the same 
lens of the feelings discussed in Fallible Man when Ricœur broaches a dimension of insight in which 
we somehow perceive or recognize what he terms our “oriented field.” Here he refers to the 
precious moments that offer us a glimpse of our tensional status of belonging as “atmospheric 
feelings.” 
Ricœur describes these moments of awareness rooted in feeling as exceeding the confines 
of purely speculative investigation. As such, they are described as “formless, without knowledge 
of its object.” In their formlessness, these feelings are most revealing, because while “not all 
atmospheric feelings are ontological,” “the ontological does manifest itself through formless 
affective moods.” They are “thought but not known” such that if “being is beyond essence, if it is 
horizon, it is understandable that the feelings that most radically interiorize the supreme intention 
of reason might themselves be without form.” Resisting and escaping the categorization of 
speculative language, these feelings are moods that “cannot be named” by speculative language, 
but nevertheless mark our “ontological bearing.”20 
The “atmospheric feelings” point to an intermediary experience of what speculative 
thought conceives of only in terms of polarized relations: 
Knowing, because it exteriorizes and poses its object in being, sets up a fundamental 
cleavage between the object and the subject. It ‘detaches’ the object or ‘opposes it’ to the I. 
In short, knowing constitutes the duality of subject and object. Feeling is understood, by 
contrast as the manifestation of a relation to the world that constantly restores our 
complicity with it, our inherence and belonging in it, something more profound than all 
polarity and duality.21 
The illuminating power of such deeply rooted feeling for the human experience lies in its 
rejection of a polarizing division of subjectivity and objectivity. Such presence of feeling allows two 
modalities to confront each other in a tensional interplay that potentially, even if only momentarily 
and/or in a consciousness that rejects time-bound categorization of thought, exceeds speculative 
thought’s appropriation and reconfiguration of experience into rational understanding. 
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Despite this occasional apprehension of “ontological bearing” that orients us toward the 
horizon of our belonging, Ricœur concludes in Fallible Man and similarly in The Rule of Metaphor 
that “we live in the subject-object duality that has structured our language” and therefore this 
relationship between poles “can be reached only indirectly.”22 In speculative language we may 
conceptualize an experience of reconciliatory tension, an experience that may be felt, potentially, 
as the atmospheric feeling. Such conceptualizing, for Ricœur, occurs through structures like the 
Kantian transcendental imagination, discussed in both the philosophy of the will and the theory of 
the living metaphor, but a gap or “blind point” remains when it comes to fully understanding, in 
speculative language as knowledge, the excess of meaning that lives in our formless feelings.23 We 
ourselves as embodied existents may be the intermediary status of extremes, of the sensible and 
intellectual, of subjectivity and objectivity. We may be “the affective region between living and 
thinking,” but the objectivity that governs our discursive language cannot, Ricœur concludes, 
present that region of the in-between, that which bridges the gap between freedom and nature to 
us.24 Ricœur writes: 
Feeling appears as a coloring of the soul […] now then since the whole of our language has 
been worked out in the dimension of objectivity- in which the subject and object are distinct 
and opposed, feeling can be described only paradoxically as the unity of an intention and 
an affectation, of an intention toward the world and an affectation of the self. This paradox, 
however is only a sign pointing toward the mystery of feeling, namely, the undivided 
connection of my existence with being and being through desire and love. […] We betray 
this unity of intention and affection as soon as we allow ourselves to be taken in by the 
language of objectivity in which we are condemned to express it.25 
Poetic discourse, because it is not the language of objectivity, as shown throughout The 
Rule of Metaphor, offers a means of translating experience into a linguistic register that can, 
potentially, hold the intermediary status without discursively limiting it to speculative categories 
such as true and false, subjective and objective. Encouraging individuals to cultivate their own 
practice of poetic discourse, can, I suggest, aid in developing a poetic consciousness that, while not 
offering a speculative grasp of intermediary states of being, may encourage awareness and an 
ability to be-with rather than deny or ignore our primordial discord. 
That metaphorical discourse is a tensional interplay, a non-static reconciliatory presence 
of tensions capable of representing inner modes of conflict, is developed in The Rule of Metaphor as 
a play between poles of identity and difference and, more generally, as the dialectic of mimesis and 
poiesis. Ricœur writes: 
[…] metaphor is established as the schematism in which the metaphorical attribution is 
produced. This schematism turns imagination into the place where the figurative meaning 
emerges in the interplay of identity and difference. And metaphor is that place in discourse 
where this schematism is visible, because the identity and the difference do not melt 
together but confront each other. 
In metaphorical discourse there manifests a world of meaningful representation in which 
identity and difference confront each other. In this dialectical relationship is a reformulation of the 
tensional interplay between objectivity and subjectivity that dominated Ricœur’s early work: 
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identity is an objective degree of character analyzed through the archeology of the subject and 
difference is the counterpart to identity, the subjective perspective constantly and indefinitely 
transcended through the comprehension of meaning that occurs through the dominating look.26 
Ricœur emphasizes that in the space of mimetic creation the conversing of identity and difference 
do not melt together into an indistinguishable mass. They maintain a tensional status, referred to 
as metaphorical truth, where the poetic image that readers perceive is neither true nor false, but 
both as the living metaphor becomes the resolution of the enigmatic and paradoxical play between 
the real and the unreal: “Metaphorical meaning, as we saw, is not the enigma itself, the semantic 
clash pure and simple, but the solution of the enigma, the inauguration of the new semantic 
pertinence.”27 Through a reconciliatory “seeing-as,” we are not forced into the dichotomous view 
of either/or but we can exist in the space of both/and: “The paradox of the poetic can be summed 
up entirely in this, that the elevation of feeling to fiction is the condition of its mimetic use. Only a 
feeling transformed into myth can open and discover the world.”28 In metaphorical discourse’s 
mimetically created intermediary space between being and non-being one encounters a voice 
vehement in the expression it gives to the felt experiences that escape ordinary language, referred 
to by Ricœur as metaphor’s “ontological vehemence.”29 
The Rule of Metaphor thus shows how metaphorical (i.e. poetic) expression rejects the binary 
ultimatums that positivistic formalism would enforce upon its classifications of experience. The 
poetic dimension of meaning is one in which, Ricœur claims, “creation and revelation coincide.”30 
Entering this tensional dimension of metaphorical truth, a reader/interpreter perceives a world that 
Berggren describes as the “poetic schemata of inner life.” In The Rule of Metaphor, however, this 
“schemata of inner life” is not the Kantian schematism of analogy. It is a schema more closely 
related to what Ricœur labels the non-verbal image that emerges from and transcends the Kantian 
schema, because it depicts a world in which “the opposition between exterior and interior ceases 
to be valid.”31 To exemplify this structure of meaning, Ricœur cites Berggren’s use of the lake of 
ice at the bottom of Dante’s Inferno, which Ricœur explains, “proclaims the reciprocity of the inner 
and the outer.” Through the “poetic schemata of inner life” that is the lake of ice, we readers begin 
to see evil as the non-verbal being that Satan frozen in ice presents us with. His being is not caught 
in a polarization of either empirically objective or emotively subjective, either external or internal, 
true or false. He is a metaphorically true visualization of an inner structure of life – the evil that 
permeates in our world, in humanity and in ourselves. 
This register of meaning that is metaphorically true, an inner structure of life that requires 
aesthetic mediation in which “creation and revelation coincide,” is where, I suggest, overlap with 
the intermediary status explored in the philosophy of the will occurs: 
If metaphor adds nothing to the description of the world, at least it adds to the ways in 
which we perceive; and this is the poetic function of metaphor. This still rests upon 
resemblance, but at the level of feelings. In symbolizing one situation by means of another, 
metaphor ‘infuses’ the feelings attached to the symbolizing situation into the heart of the 
situation that is symbolized. In this ‘transference of feelings,’ the similarity between feelings 
is induced by the resemblance of situations. In its poetic function, therefore, metaphor 
extends the power of double meaning from the cognitive realm to the affective.32 
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In this passage, Ricœur discusses a poetic function of language in terms of the affective 
modality of being discussed in Fallible Man. Through metaphorical discourse, one engages a 
semantic innovation that presents a symbolizing situation: the level of figurativization of the non-
verbally configured expression of feeling related to inner structures of life. Ricœur, however, does 
not explicitly connect The Rule of Metaphor’s insights to his philosophy of the will as his task is to 
focus on a reading and exposition of metaphorical truth, especially at the intersection of poetic and 
speculative discourses. A poetics of the self allows this connection to be made by explicitly 
suggesting that the creative and revelatory function of metaphorical truth can be aligned with the 
human’s primal discord discussed in the philosophy of the will. 
Applying a Poetics of the Self 
To exemplify a poetics of the self as a movement through praxis, I would interpret the 
above example of Berggren further than Ricœur’s own reading of it in The Rule of Metaphor. Ricœur 
and Berggren provide an analysis of the schematism of Dante’s poetics – a theoretical study of the 
atmospheric feelings of a being situated as an intermediary between good and evil. This “feeling” 
is configured through the poetry of the Divine Comedy’s “seeing-as” through the experience of the 
pilgrim’s encounter with Satan. This “poetic” truth is then configured into the greater narrative of 
Dante’s journey through hell, purgatory and paradise, all of which is interpreted by a reader 
engaging in a critical hermeneutics of text. A hermeneutics of text, however, is also always a 
hermeneutics of the self, as Ricœur’s theory of explanation and understanding shows.33 Is, I 
question through this formulation of a poetics of the self, reading and interpretation of a text 
enough to put an individual in illuminating contact with their own primordial discord? Is it 
enough, to continue with the example of Ricœur and Berggren, to live and know that discord as 
intimately as Dante-pilgrim does, where he not only encounters his affective fragility, but also 
poetically integrates and expresses it through the consciousness of Dante-poet? 
A poetics of the self interrupts the interpretive process of self-discovery developed by 
Ricœur by connecting that process back to his philosophy of the will. In doing so, it invites us to 
ask many questions. As we read with Berggren, the question arises – what of my experience of 
evil? What of yours? How do we gain awareness of our own experiences of such a primordial 
“feeling” within the framework of a critical hermeneutics of the text before us – be that text Dante’s 
Divine Comedy or a story of a recent shooting in the news? Through the praxis that is a poetics of 
the self, can we move into authentic and reflexive poetic descriptions of our own lived experiences 
inspired by the texts we read and/or the histories we inherit? Might this movement support the 
journey of appropriation and disappropriation in a new way?34 Moreover, might doing so become 
an engaged practice through which the living metaphor spurs us to “think more,” where that 
“thinking more” gives way to our own creative impulses and formulations of feelings excavated 
by the texts we read or the situations we encounter? In the end, is it enough to “think” our way 
through a text? Is reading poetry enough to encounter the dialectic of philosophical and poetic 
discourse put forth by Ricœur or do we need to embody it in our own consciousness and 
expression? Would doing so open us to awareness of our affective fragilities through a poetic 
consciousness capable of existing in structures that simultaneously are and are not real, imagined, 
or true? Would such awareness allow us to live as more self-aware and moral beings? 
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These are questions that emerge from this explorative conceptualization of a poetics of the 
self, acknowledging that while we are not all capable of writing as Dante wrote, we are all capable 
of feeling the discord of Dante-poet and Dante-pilgrim (an excellent metanarrative example of the 
ipse/idem dialectic) in that we are all humans – all born into servile will with the ability to feel and 
become conscious of the suffering and joy that our existential fault condemns us to and liberates 
us from. Do we, a poetics of the self ultimately asks, need to express the dimensions of felt discord 
in the only linguistic register capable of configuring such inherent discord, in poetry, in order to 
increase our awareness of its presence within us?35 Without inviting our own poetic impulses to 
manifest, do we risk living caught between the polarities of repression and promethean defiance 
that exploring our inner conflicts only in speculative language may, possibly, restrict us to? 
In line with John Wall’s consideration that there exists within each human a moral 
responsibility to create, I would respond to the last question, yes.36 For instance, if we developed 
cultures of education in which students were taught that poetic discourse is a valid medium in 
which to express oneself, might we be able to cultivate a more emotionally aware society? 
Especially if such poetic expressions were themselves incorporated into individual and cultural 
hermeneutic endeavours and learning models. I believe a poetics of the self has much to offer our 
individual and cultural practices of education and that Ricœur’s philosophy is the groundwork of 
explaining why this is the case. Namely, that through the philosophy of the will and the 
hermeneutics of the living metaphor, a poetics of the self invites a register through which to become 
aware of and express what is a condition of being human: the paradox of living as a suffering being 
who experiences and intimately knows joy, a primordial discord that parallels dialectics of identity 
and difference, ipse and idem, freedom and nature. Social conditions and structures of power and 
privilege contribute to a body’s place within the spectrum of suffering and these social conditions 
need to be examined as a component of a poetics of the self. All humans, however – male, female 
and non-binary – suffer. Perhaps learning to feel and express our own suffering through a poetics 
of the self, and eventually interpreting and reconfiguring those poetic utterances into structures of 
emplotment and narrative identity, if possible, is a method of learning to hear others more 
authentically as well. 
Conclusion 
Wall similarly suggests that in order to fully embody our creative potentials as interpreting 
subjects, it is not enough to read, we also must create: 
What is “creative” here? It is that nothing is simply already given, neither our historicity 
nor the meaning of texts. […] As Theodore Marius Van Leeuwen has well put it, Ricœur 
sees in language “the surplus of meaning” – a surplus of the meaning of historicity, I would 
add, that it is each self's responsibility to create.37 
Opening up the creative responsibility of a self who posits herself in the world is a moral 
responsibility for Wall. While I agree with his stance, looking at the creative impulse of every 
individual in terms of reinterpreting the philosophy of the will through the living metaphor of 
poetic discourse rather than applying it to morality and theories of justice, I view introducing the 
poetic act as part of the hermeneutic journey of self-understanding. Doing so cultivates a practice 
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that links the interpreter to her primordial and tensional status of selfhood in the affective fragility 
that, regardless of one’s social positionality, affects us all as a condition of being human. 
Accordingly, I would add to Ricœur’s statement in “What is a text?” when he writes: “[…] in 
reflective hermeneutics- the constitution of the self is contemporaneous with the constitution of 
meaning […]” that, from the view of a poetics of the self, the constitution of self is contemporaneous 
with a poetic consciousness of the self’s internally perceived, intuited and poetically expressed 
feelings of primordial discord.38 A new formulation of selfhood can then surface in an embodied 
dialectic between rational meaning and poetic awareness. 
Such a dialectic of selfhood relates to Helenius’ focus on fragility when he cites Amalric’s 
poetic-practical dialectic: 
[…] it is possible to achieve a notion of the self, but there always remains an original discord 
that reveals how fundamental the human condition of “shattered cogito” (cogito brisé) 
ultimately is. The fragile unity of the self is never immediate. Instead, the self is always 
mediated through its acts both a poetic and practical kind.39 
While conceptually I agree with Amalric’s claim that the fragile unity of the self is never 
immediate, I believe this is only true if it is specified that this lack of unity occurs within the 
structures and inclusion of an individual’s speculative and thought-knowing self, as was the case 
in Ricœur’s theory. For this is why the living metaphor’s truth, ultimately, cannot be grasped by 
speculative thought. The imagery of metaphor’s truth represents the inner structure of the 
paradoxical feeling itself which speculative language will never achieve.40 Speculative language is 
not comprised of a paradoxical and non-dichotomous structure like the metaphorical discourse 
which is and is not; however, our embodied experiences, the preliterary occasions of suffering, as 
Buss argues and Ricœur himself put forth, do manifest, in immediacy I would claim, both discord 
and unity.41 
Translation of what is preliterary, namely embodied experiences that can correspond to 
the discord of existential fault and primordial suffering into the structures of rational thought is, 
then, not necessarily possible. Such experiences, as trauma theorist Cathy Caruth suggests, may 
even defy emplotment.42 Yet poetic language does, as Amalric and Ricœur suggest, mediate our 
awareness of what is felt but not known. Perhaps, I suggest as a conclusion to this article, there is 
a level of poetic consciousness that defies conceptual knowing yet is as equally important to healthy 
and moral living. Only practice, however, through turning the objectified and theorized self into 
the poetic-agent that creatively engages with her own historicity and her own expressions of 
discord and belonging will allow this theoretical concept of a poetics of the self to enter a realm of 
praxis. As Ricœur wrote of our own poetic rootedness: 
Poetic discourse brings to language a pre-objective world in which we find ourselves 
already rooted, but in which we also project our inner most possibilities. We must thus dismantle 
the reign of objects in order to let be and to allow to be uttered our primordial belonging to a world 
which we inhabit that is to say which at once precedes us and receives the imprint of our works.43 
A poetics of self calls for the interpreter to become a poet. Not for the sake of establishing 
literary success or promoting solipsistic writings as “great” poetry, but for the sake of inviting her 
own consciousness to touch and know her own fallibility through the cultivation of poetic 
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awareness. Helenius articulates such a move in terms of recognizing the cultural imagination at 
the heart of Ricœur’s phenomenological hermeneutics: 
I maintain that Ricœur’s phenomenological hermeneutics of being able is ultimately based 
on the cultural imagination initiating tradition-conscious change in the social reality that than 
facilitates the post-critical appropriation of one’s self as capable. In short, I claim that l’imagination 
culturelle is the basis for a sociocultural poetics of human action and, therefore, a condition for the 
birth of a situated subject in the positive fullness of belonging.44 
Eventually, especially if creative praxis is integrated into the model of a hermeneutics of 
the self, a poetics of the self will integrate into narrative identity as one progresses in self-
understanding through a reflexive and creatively cognizing act. The reconfigurations of selfhood 
that narrative identity offers the interpreter turned poet are a means to integrate poetic 
consciousness into time-bound and, more importantly for our current culture, socially impacted 
narratives of freedom and bondage. However, Ricœur’s philosophy of the will and theory of the 
living metaphor ultimately suggest that there is value in allowing the paradoxical expressions of 
primordial discord to remain as poetic utterances without configuration into emplotment. To that 
point, I offer, as closing, Ricœur’s words that “poetry never humbles except to heal: its hum 
provokes a conversion, as consciousness renouncing the attempt at self-positing receives being 
with wonder and seeks in the world and in the involuntary a manifestation of transcendence which 
is given to me as a mighty comparison of my freedom.”45 This passage suggests that a degree of 
healing occurs when we allow ourselves to enter the conversion offered through poetic discourse 
where the goal is not to understand ourselves fully or rationally, but to acquire the poetic 
consciousness that surfaces in a poetics of the self. Given that we all experience existential discord 
as conditional to being human, it would stand that we all require the existential healing of which 
Ricœur writes. Poetry thus becomes the aesthetic mediation able to facilitate that healing through 
the creative self-discovery one enters into through an act of self-reflexive creative-mimesis in the 
intermediary status of metaphorical truth and its tensional status of being that offers a “mighty 
comparison to my freedom.” 
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